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This article analyses the consequences of the “methanol wine scandal” on the wine production 
market of Piedmont. Contrariwise to what is usually claimed, these consequences where not the 
direct result of the scandal, but emerged only when a change in the institutional configuration of 
the market came about. The paper illustrates how the institutional change following the scandal 
triggered the quality turn of the wine production market in Piedmont. The key processes at the 
root of this change are depicted in terms of quality conventions as coordination mechanisms 
embedded in the institutional context. The first part of the paper outlines the conceptual 
coordinates concerning the “social construction” of quality. Afterwards both the general and 
regional trends toward the quality production in the national and local wine sector are 
summarized. Then “the methanol wine scandal” and its institutional consequences are illustrated. 
Finally, to appreciate the current organization of the local production market and of the quality 
conventions among wine producers, findings from interviews with local entrepreneurs are 
reported.  
 








Over the past twenty-five years the wine production market (1) in Piedmont has had considerable 
reorganisation in terms of production quality. This structural change is often associated to the 
event occurred in 1986, which became known as the “methanol wine scandal”. The scandal had 
catastrophic consequences: eventually twenty-three dead, tens of people poisoned and suffering 
from serious injuries. At a national level exports collapsed immediately after the scandal by a 
third (from nearly 18 to about 11 million hectolitres), and a turnover from 1,668 to1,260 billion 
lire (a quarter less). Today the situation is radically different and both Italian and Piedmont wine 
production have reached the peak of world ranking in terms of export and quality (Odorici and 
Corrado 2009). Nevertheless, the relationship between the scandal and the transformation of 
wine production market towards quality has always been assumed rather then actually 
established. 
The paper analyses firstly the cultural implications of the “methanol wine scandal” event 
and it argues next that its economic consequences on the wine production market where to 
appear only when a change in the institutional configuration of the market came about. The key 
claim of this paper is hence that the transforming power of macro-events, to which historical 
sociology attributes a crucial role in the process of social change (Sewell 1006; Griffin 1992), 
occurs if these events change pre-existing institutional rules.  
 
* Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Rural Sociology conference “Ripensare il rurale” in Altomonte 
(CS), 2009; at the Summer School in Local Development “Sebastiano Brusco”, Seneghe (Or), 2010; at the Annual 
Conference of the Department of Social Science, University of Torino, 2011; and at the Department of Sociology, 
Center for the Study of Economy and Society, University of Cornell, 2012. We are grateful to comments and 
criticism received, as well as to the two anonymous referees of this journal for their suggestions. Finally, we thank 
the Turin CRT Foundation for the 2009 grant “I mercati di produzione del vino in Piemonte”. 
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We will thus illustrate how the institutional change following the scandal fed the shift of 
the wine production market in Piedmont. We will analyse the key processes at the root of this 
change in terms of quality conventions as coordination mechanisms embedded in the 
institutional context (Borghi e Vitale 2006; Ponte and Gibbon 2005; Ponte 2009). 
The first part of the paper outlines the conceptual coordinates concerning the “social 
construction of quality”, at the crossroad between judgement and choice (par. 2 e 2.1), and it 
summarizes how quality conventions have been applied in the field of rural sociology. 
Afterwards both the general and regional trends toward the quality production in the wine sector 
are illustrated (par. 3). The fourth section investigates “the methanol wine scandal” by analysing 
articles from the daily newspaper “La Stampa” between March-June 1986 (par. 4). The 
reconstruction of the institutional consequences of the scandal have been based on historical 
archives, secondary data source as well as from in-depht interviews from sommeliers and 
winemakers (par. 5). Finally, to appreciate how the local production market and quality 
conventions are currently organized we have collected fifty structured interviews from 
entrepreneurs of the local wine sector (par. 6).  
 
2. Quality as a Social Construction 
Since Berger e Luckmann's work (1966) the theme of “social construction” is customary in 
social theory. This identifies the idea that no event in itself is either objective or inevitable, but 
its causes and consequences depend on a vast array of social processes that attribute an identity 
to the event itself (Lynn, Podolny e Tao 2009, 756). Talking of “the social construction of 
quality” thus means raising the question of the controversial processes through which qualities 
are attributed, stabilized, objectified and arranged (Callon et al. 2002, 199). Convention 
economics or convention theory (Boltanski e Thévenot, 2006; Jadg 2007) shows how these 
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processes work through coordination mechanisms that reduce “radical uncertainty”. This kind of 
uncertainty cannot be lowered through contractual arrangements, incentives and prices (as in 
standard economic theory: cfr. Milgrom and Roberts 1992) but requires agreements or 
conventions (often implicit) about what’s worth and what is equal to what (Stark 2009). The 
understanding of these “agreements” or “quality conventions” is a crucial task for a true 
sociological analysis of markets (Fligstein e Dauter 2007, 113).  
Quality conventions have two main features (Borghi e Vitale 2006): (i) interdependency 
between the cognitive and the normative dimension; (ii) placement in and dependence on groups, 
organizations and institutional contexts. Conventions can thus be defined as: “shared templates 
for interpreting situations and planning courses of action in mutually comprehensive ways that 
involve social accountability, that is, they provide a basis for judging the appropriateness of 
action by self and others” (Biggart and Beamish 2003: 444, emphasis added). Convention theory 
argues (Eymard-Duvernay 1989) that price is the main management form of a specific market 
only if there is no radical uncertainty about quality. When price alone cannot evaluate quality, 
actors set up conventions linked to other “forms of coordination” (Ponte and Gibbon 2009). 
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) elaborate six “worlds” of “legitimate common welfare”: 
inspirational, domestic, opinion/fame, civic, market and industrial worlds. Each order of worth 
defines the good, the just and the fair and sets the very fabric of calculation: every “economy” is 
therefore a moral order. In domestic coordination, uncertainty about quality is solved through 
trust and long-term relationships. In industrial coordination, uncertainty about quality is settled 
through common standards enforced via instrument-based testing, inspection and certification. 
Civic coordination works where there is collective commitment to welfare, and the identity of a 
product is related to its impact upon society or the environment. In the world of fame, 
uncertainty about quality is solved through public celebrity. Worth derives from the opinion of 
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experts: it is this kind of opinion that establishes success. Finally, in the inspired world all the 
things such as measures, rules, money, hierarchy, and laws that support and outfit equivalence 
and worth are missing. What is worthy is what cannot be controlled, what is felt in inner 
experience, manifested by feelings and passions and what rejects habits, norms and principles. 
Conventions are worthwhile analytical tools to understand the “economies of quality” (see 
Callon, Méadel e Rabeharison 2002), where the value of goods can’t be established only by price 
and quality standards as signals are hence crucial. This is particularly so in the service economy 
or in markets such as art and wine, where the attributes of the product are difficult to unpack 
from the consumer viewpoint (Beckert 2009, 254). In these cases institutional tools that signal 
quality are essential for supply and demand to meet: the judgment of agents about the quality of a 
good or service come before the choice to buy that good or service (Karpik 2010).  
In the field of rural sociology, the theory of conventions has been applied to a variety of 
research problems such as: wine production (Ponte 2009), non-standard food 
production/consumption practices (Murdoch and Miele 1999), local partnership between 
producers and consumers (Lamine 2005), alternative food networks (Sage 2003; Goodman 
2009), turn to quality in food production and consumption (Murdoch, Marsden and Banks 2000), 
culinary networks (Murdoch and Miele 2004), and geographical indication (Barham 2003). The 
application of conventions theory in rural sociology spells out how different conceptions of 
quality are combined, thus supporting the idea that: “Regardless of the time period or context in 
which quality is examined, the concept has had multiple and often muddled definitions and has 
been used to describe a wide variety of phenomena” (Reeves and Bednar 1994, 419). In this line, 
Goodman (1999) urges us to consider less how nature is constantly subject to capitalist 
domination than to pay more attention to the various complex ways in which nature-society 
hybrids are produced in the food sector. Besides, the previously quoted contributions showed 
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that in: “reality clear distinctions cannot be made between definitions of quality and that boundaries 
between categories are often blurred” (Sage 2003, 7). This paper endorses this view and argues 
that quality is a slippery and ambiguos concept with many meanings. This ambiguity needs to be 
solved through interactions between actors rather than from pre-defined and exogenous criteria 
(Lamine 2005, 325). The application of the theory of conventions in rural sociology thus 
supports the idea that quality is one of the most important force leading to the raise and change of 
markets and, at the same time, the “power” of quality must be found over and above 
informations and prices. A standard economic view (Tirole 1988) that assumes an “objective” 
idea of quality sidesteps the process through which a mutual judgment about quality raises, 
changes and, eventually, even disappears. As we will see in the next section, the theory of 
conventions sheds light on this process. 
 
2.1 Quality Conventions between Judgement and Choice 
 
 Often in social theory judgement and choice are radically opposed to one another. This 
opposition develops along three lines: (i) the logic of action, (ii) the explanation of order and (iii) 
the concept of social change. In connection with the first dimension, choice relies on analytic 
rationality: the meaning of an action is defined by the intention of the agent and is reflected in 
the outcome (Pizzorno 2006). Contrariwise, judgement refers to the ways people “evaluate each 
other” and the meaning of an action is what those to whom the action is directed at understand it 
to be: “one undertakes to see the world as others do – not because the benefit of doing so 
outweights the cost, but because that is the way of being in the world with these people” (Loury 
2002, 44, emphasis added). Choice thus relies on the rational capacity to act for a future state, 
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while judgement depends on the way an action is received in a “circle of recognition” who 
judges it as being socially valid (Pizzorno 2006).  
 Secondly, in the choice model social order is likened to efficient sanctioning mechanisms 
in a contractual prospective (Coleman 1990), while in the judgement model society is created 
above all thanks to successful naming processes (Oberschall e Kim 1996, 64). For Hobbes and 
neo-contractual solutions (Taylor 1987) society is generated from a more or less (de)centralised 
ability to control each other through formal and informal sanctions (Hechter 1990), while in the 
judgement model it is when the human being is no longer solitary and enters some social 
relationship that social order begins (White 2008).  
 Finally, the model of choice looks at social change as the result of human efforts to 
control their environment (North 2005, chap. 1). The key to understand change is the motivation 
of agents, their capacity to understand problems and the beliefs which guide their actions. In 
contrast theories of judgement look at the exogenous contextual changes. When the sources of 
naming change, semantic and ontological uncertainty occur (Lane e Maxfield 2005) and agents 
face a sort of “symbolic tsunami” (Pizzorno 2006, 392). Here the threat derives from the lack of 
meaning and of ontological stability that can be attributed to a course of action and its potential 
outcomes. For example, the social change created by the French revolution had its founding 
moment in the “Taking of the Bastille”, 14th July 1789 (Sewell 1996). But what everyone now 
defines as the “Taking of the Bastille’” was actually the result of a complex interaction, which 
evolved from declarations, debates and symbolic behaviour. The change of the definition is 
accompanied by changes both in the behaviour of individuals and in the stand of the various 
groups and parties involved (Pizzorno 2006). 
However, just like the opposition of interest and identity (Macy 1997), choice and 
judgement can find substantial analytical connections. The radical nature of the distinction 
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between choice and judgement relies on two highly debatable points: (i) naming stabilizes the 
identity of social actors and (ii) the changing of sources for naming is exogenous to on going 
social action. If these two assumptions are true, the judgement model has no need for the concept 
of choice. The sources of social recognition, when they are at hand, balance out both individual 
action and social order. Furthermore, if social change is exogenous to the action course, the 
sources of naming can’t be the aim of an intentional choice. However, these conditions are not 
always met.  
First of all, naming is not always stabilizing for social action. Keeping willy-nilly a tie to 
the sources of naming can be counter-productive, as it becomes a cause of semantic contradiction 
that does not guarantee stability to one's action. As Harrison White illustrated (2008, chap. 8) the 
so-called “control strategies” play here an important role. Control is considered the sum of 
attempts that agents rely on to control “confusion” as well as the contingency of stimuli coming 
from their social ties (Azarian 2005). A crucial control strategy is decoupling, through which 
agents isolate themselves from undesired ties and unwilling dependencies. Actually the very 
identity of agents is the non-deterministic result of these attempts to control/justify stimuli 
coming from their social ties. Hence an identity asserts itself when agents establish control 
strategies that last out the contingencies that affect them.  
The importance of controlling strategies also weakens the second assumption. Changes in 
the sources of naming are not always exogenous to the action itself but can switch according to 
specific strategies. We will illustrate this point by comparing briefly Mancur Olson’s collective 
action theory (1965) with the concepts of “private network goods” and “specialized public 
goods” (Bellanca 2007). Olson showed that the formation of groups, associations, or movements 
could not be explained instrumentally on the basis of individual rationality. This works well in 
pure economic interdependency (e.g. market situations) where individual interest can be take as 
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given. But in phenomena of social interdependency (Pizzorno 2006) where: “the goal for which 
people mobilize, is a by-product of the mobilization itself” (Baldassarri 2010, 403), other 
mechanisms can make collective action. For instance in “private network goods” individual 
utility depends on the number of individuals who consume or produce that particular good. In 
standard collective action literature the strategies can thus be contained within the assurance 
game, in which cooperation is worthwhile only if it is reciprocal (Cornes e Sandler 1986). 
However, “private network goods” can create not economic interdependency but rather social 
interdependency. Consider, for example, the creative life-styles in metropolitan areas (Florida 
2005), or the political-aesthetic mixes which drive quality enogastronomy (Sassatelli e Davolio 
2010). In these cases goods take their value from being produced or consumed within a restricted 
circle that attributes value to such choices (Pizzorno 2006). Thanks to this social 
interdependency, agents are inclined to generate a network, which constructs the source of value 
for their own action, thus avoiding the Olson’s paradox.  
“Specialized public goods” are the second type of goods key to understand the 
endogenous nature of change (Bellanca, see in particular pp. 42-51). As with pure public goods 
“specialized public goods” are non-exclusive and non-rival. However, unlike the former, the user 
can take full advantage only if certain access costs are paid for. For instance, understanding a 
specific jargon is needed to take part in a political coalition. But this jargon it is not a universal 
public good as whoever takes advantage of it has a particularly high entrance cost. “Specialized 
public goods” also avoid the Olson paradox: whoever wants to learn the language for the specific 
sub-group or coalition automatically feeds into the collective network. Coming away from the 
collective action in this case would mean substituting a shared language with a private one. Just 
like in collective action problems “private network goods” and “specialized public goods” also 
need to deal with congestion created by too many participants. The more people who use the 
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specialised language that has been learnt with great efforts makes the language more fuzzy. At 
this point exit costs are lowered, it is worthwhile for people who first learnt the specialised 
language with such effort to leave the coalition and try to found another. This can occur either 
attempting to regain a sort of “purity” of the original message (Bellanca, ibidem, pp. 44-51), or 
negating the validity of the message and so renouncing the fruits of the common good.  
All in all, two key working hypotheses can be derived from the arguments so far outlined. 
First and foremost, quality conventions are coherent with the institutional context in which the 
market is embedded. As we said in the introduction macro events, such as the methanol wine 
scandal, generated social change if they change pre-existing institutional context. The change 
happens not so much and not only when new “ideas” evolve, but rather when these ideas become 
specific institutional rules. Secondly, we can think of the quality economy created by these 
institutional rules as being characterised by a “quality cycle”. In the first phase, quality is 
assumed as a shared and general judgement criteria; then congestion problems arise and a 
semantic inflation occurs, thus watering down the signalling power of quality. We will illustrate 
how this two working hypotheses shed light on the change of wine production market in 
Piedmont. 
 
3. Wine Production in Italy: General Trends and Regional Models 
 
Italy is the first producers of wine in quantity and the second in value, after France. Wine 
firms are 700,000 for a revenue of 8,3 billions of euro (25% of worldwide value; more than 30% 
in quantity). The production of wine in Italy has changed dramatically since the end of the 
eighties: growing area and wine production have reduced, the VQPRD “certified origin” wine 
(DOC/DOCG) has grown while table wine has weakened, and a decrease in the number of firms 
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occurred by about 60% in the last twenty years (Odorici and Corrado 2004; Mediobanca 2011). 
The absolute number of certified origin wines is prevalent in Northern Italy (153), followed by 
central Italy (100), then the South (69) and finally the Islands (43). The same trend towards 
quality has occurred with the economic structure, where wine production has significantly 
changed. Within this general picture, two indicators can sum up the regional features of wine 
production in Italy: (i) the relationship between export value on the total of agrofood exportation 
and (ii) the relation between VQPRD wine production and overall wine production. 
 
 
Fig. 1 about here 
 
These two indicators classify Italian regions both according to VQPRD wine production and in 
terms of the magnitude of export. We can appreciate a positive correlation between VQPRD 
wine production and exportation, which confirms the general trend towards the “economy of 
quality” in the wine sector (Corr. = 0,42; Sig. 0,1). However, the correlation is far from perfect 
and it shows how quality production is not always associated with a high degree of 
competitiveness in the international market. In the same way, the amount of wine exports can be 
high even with small amounts of VQPRD wine (lower right quadrant). 
The positioning of Italian regions in the different clusters is the outcome of different 
institutional choices. This is exemplified by the two regions portrayed in black (Fig. 1), which 
were deeply implicated in the “methanol wine scandal”, Piedmont (upper right quadrant) and 
Apulia (lower left quadrant). Fig. 2 shows the different paths taken from the year in which the 
scandal occurred: in 1986, Apulia already had 90% of the VQPRD denomination of origin it 
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currently has, against the 60% for Piedmont. In the subsequent period, the situation in Apulia 
stabilised while Piedmont continued its growth with particular intensity after mid 90’s.  
 
Fig. 2 about here 
 A closer look at the institutional change that took place in mid ‘90s it is thus key to 
understand the “social construction” of wine production in Piedmont. First, however, we need to 
figure out how the “methanol wine scandal” changed the conceptions of quality in the wine 
sector. 
4. Quality as Salvation: the “Methanol Wine Scandal”. 
 In March 1986 the methanol wine scandal broke in Italy. This happened following some 
deaths from intoxication from methanol alcohol: the investigations that took place showed that a 
network of unscrupulous traders was using this substance to change the alcoholic proof of wine. 
Italy had an over-production problem so before the scandal merchants, not estate wineries, made 
money. It was only about 15–20 years ago that wineries started being successful (Negro et al. 
2007). It was clear from the beginning that there was a concentration of frauds in Northern Italy 
and in particular in the Piedmont provinces of Asti, Alessandria and Cuneo, although the first 
investigations found a link with Apulia and Emilia-Romagna.  
We have reconstructed the scandal by analysing 165 articles from the daily newspaper, 
“La Stampa”, in the period between March and May 1986. There were clutches of different 
interpretations of the event to define “what had really happened”, as it occurs with transforming 
events that generate social change (Sewell 1996). A quote taken from a local producer (Negro et 
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al. 2007, 9) gives the taste of what happened: “In 1986 the methanol scandal broke. In my 
opinion that destroyed completely all the links that existed… I can ensure you that those 6 
months were months of confusion and rage… a generation that didn’t have experiences was very 
open to receive new ideas” (emphasis added). Four different narratives structured the collective 
effort to establish the meaning of the event. In the very beginning was the rhetoric of the “rotten 
apples”: corrupt traders were only deviant acts which did not affect the system as a whole and 
dead people were just “heavy drinkers” who methanol kills only for they drunk large quantities 
of wine. Subsequently, the attention shifted to whole group of controlling bodies for the control 
of food safety and fraud (the “rhetoric of control”). The various actors involved at different 
levels of the crisis called for new laws against contamination and fraud, greater availability of 
officials and means for stricter control of traders and producers. In both these rhetorical devices 
the productive system remained intact and fault was laid on a small number of delinquents, or on 
the scarce efficiency of the controlling bodies. In a third phase the problem became the “race to 
the bottom”: this problem did not so much focus on the producers but on the organisation of the 
value-chain. The culprits were above all the large supermarkets, which required very low quality 
products from the producers to meet the demands of the lower ranges of the market. To face this 
problem, the association of producers in Piedmont proposed publishing a minimum price under 
which it would no longer be able to guarantee the origin of the wine. The fourth and final phase 
(the “rhetoric of quality”) started when the outlines of the affair became clearer and the penalty 
of the seven accused passed from manslaughter to murder. In Piedmont, the mayors of various 
municipalities organised petitions to send to the relevant ministries to lobby for new laws to 
defend the regional wine. This rhetoric became consolidated also thanks to an important “ritual” 
phase (Collins 2004) (2) that took place in Verona during the international trade show known as 
“Vinitaly”. The central theme debated at the show was obviously the scandal that had hit the 
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Italian wine industry and the resulting exportation crisis. During the trade show the need to shift 
“from quantity to quality” was underlined, to try to slow down production (conceived at being 
excessive for the sector) and instigating a wine production catalogue bringing the VQPRD 
classification laws up to date and turning the promotional campaign towards the development of 
wine closely linked to food consumption education.  
As we will show, the “methanol wine scandal” and the idea of “certified quality” contributed 
to truly transform producers’s behaviour only when “quality” was translated into new 
institutional rules. Nearly ten years passed between the scandal and the adoption of these new 
rules. In this regard, the changes in the denomination of origin were one of the most important 
consequences of the measures. In Italy, the first key law concerning the setting up of 
denomination of origin was in 1963 (DPR n. 930), which intended to safeguard and regulate 
quality wine production from well-defined geographical areas. So the wine categories, 
Denominazione di origine semplice DOS (table wine) and Denominazioni di origine controllata 
DOC and garantita DOCG (VQPRD wine) were established. The effectiveness of these laws 
was put in doubt by the methanol wine scandal of 1986. In 1992 the law 164 (put into force in 
1994) interdicted the attribution of geographical indication (denominazione) or labels of origin to 
table wine and so forced producers to adhere to either DOC or DOCG to conserve their 
belonging to a terroir. Furthermore, the new IGT (indicazione geografica tipica) category was 
introduced between vino da tavola and DOC/DOCG (Odorici and Corrado 2004, 179). Law 
164/1992 that became effective in 1994 thus upheld the principles of the “certified quality” 
rhetoric, which had emerged with the scandal. The law intended to establish a closer link 
between the terroir and the certified quality, favouring the adhesion of small and medium size 
local producers to the denomination of origin system. 
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5. From the Scandal to the Institutional Change 
Twenty years after the methanol wine scandal, Italian wine production has radically changed 
towards quality production. Less is produced, more is exported in terms of value and “certified 
quality” wines have grown dramatically (Odorici and Corrado 2009). Piedmont was one of the 
key regions involved in terms of the number of firms involved in the scandal. It’s customary to 
explain the growth of quality production as the consequence of the scandal. But, as showed in 
Fig. 3, the current value of production increased before 1986, as had the decrease in quantity and 
the growth of exports. The trend widen considerably after the mid 90’s onward following the 
legislative changes we have described. However, the tendency had already begun at the 
beginning of the 80’s before the scandal. The change in the wine market therefore had an 
endogenous spark, which was then accelerated not by the scandal of 1986 but by the subsequent 
institutional changes of 1994. This is confirmed by one of our interviews: 
The change towards quality had begun before the methanol scandal. In Piedmont it had already began 
at the mid of the 70’s and consolidated in 80’s when a series of young producers introduced important 
changes. These young producers had travel the world trying to find why, Italy, which was in theory a 
wine country and made the same quantity as France, was passed over for French wines which had 
spread throughout the world whereas Italian ones had not (Interview of the President of the Italian 
Association of Sommelier, Piedmont). 
 
New schumpeterian and innovative producers had imported cultivation and wine growing 
techniques from France, thus creating a new production market. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is an 
agent of change that is the source of his well-known “creative destruction”. He introduces a new 
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good or a new method of production, opens a new market or discovers a new source of supply, 
or carries out a new organization of an industry (Schumpeter 1949). 
 
Fig. 3 about here 
  All in all, it can be argued that it was not the methanol wine scandal that generated change 
towards quality production. Rather new innovative producers had imported cultivation and wine 
growing techniques from France which were linked to the idea of terroir, but the over-
production problem as well as the weak link between wine and quality favoured merchants over 
estate wineries. This generates opportunities of exploitation by traders who were the 
protagonists of the 1986 scandal. The methanol scandal created then the “certified quality 
rhetoric” which consolidated into new institutional rules that changed the social organization of 
wine production market. One of the key institutional consequences, which promoted the spread 
of certified quality, was, as we have pointed out, the involvement of the small and medium sized 
producers in the disciplinare di produzione (denomination of origin). There are 60 disciplinari in 
Piedmont, from the pioneers of quality in the mid sixties (Barolo and Barbaresco) to the most 
recent. Piedmont is the Italian region with the largest number of disciplinari (before Tuscany) 
and the second for VQPRD wines in proportion to the total production of wine (after Trentino 
Alto Adige). The following data illustrate the enrolments of producers in the VQPRD register in 
the two provinces of Asti and Alessandria, which together make up 60% of the Piedmont wine 
growing area (3). With enrolment we mean the timing in which a producer first became a 
member of any Cadastral register of Wine growers for VQPRD wine. Figure 4 shows a turning 
point after 1994, the year in which the new regional laws came into force. In 1994 there was a 
sharp rise in the process: from 1995 there was a greater concentration of enrolments and a 
significant absolute increase as well. 
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Fig. 4 about here 
 
1994 was an important turning point both for the number of enrolments and the average size 
of the wine producers. The distribution shows that the process increased after 1994: 27% of 
enrolments occurred before 1994 and 73% after. Furthermore the correlation between seniority 
of enrollment and area enrollment is both positive and statistically significant (Corr. = 0,213; 
Sig. 0,01), indicating that the enrollment of smaller producers increased after 1994.  
If we consider the data for the province of Asti (Fig. 5), a similar trend is outlined. 1994 was 
also here an important turning point for enrollment and the introduction of the new law was 
associated with the increase of enrollment of producers. 
Fig. 5. about here 
 
 
The distribution of enrolments shows that the process exploded after 1994: 3.6% before 1994 
and 96.4% afterwards. As before, the correlation between seniority of enrollment and area 
enrollment is both positive and statistically significant (Corr. = 0,188; Sig. 0,01). 
5. The Worlds of Quality 
From 1986 nearly ten years were to pass until a system of formal rules was created to support 
quality production. From 1994 onward, the year in which the regulation referring to the new laws 
on quality production came into force, small wine producers adhered on mass to the new 
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institutional rules. This had key non-intendended consequences on the conception of quality: as 
we emphasized previously, the more agents who use the specialised language makes the 
language more fuzzy. The reference to “certified quality”, alone, it is not enough to grasp the 
plurality of conventions that actually drive producers’ actions. As we first put forward, when a 
language becomes generalised loses its ability to discriminate. As noted elsewhere the VQPRD 
classification system does not prove useful any more to designate different quality levels 
(Corrado and Odorici 2009, 114). The mechanism explaining the crisis of VQPRD classification 
is usually interpreted from the demand side, e.g. non-expert consumers typically lack the ability 
to choose among products at a medium-high quality level. But our data shows also a supply side 
mechanism: the variability of prices of VQPRD wines has increased considerably after 1994. As 
the following figure shows, the standard deviation of prices peaks in the mid 90’s together with 
the entrance of the new law and the adhesion of small producers to a disciplinare di produzione. 
This both confused consumers and watered down the discriminating power of certified quality 
among producers.  
Fig. 6 about here 
In which way, after the crisis of VQPRD classification, the wine production market in Piedmont 
and the quality conventions are currently organized? These points will be depicted through data 
taken from structured interviews to 50 local wine producers in the three provinces were nearly 
90% of the regional wine production in concentrated (Asti-Cuneo-Alessandria). The selection of 
cases was structured according to five types of firms that make up the backbone of the Piedmont 
wine market: vertically integrated firms, large bottlers, small niche vineyards, cooperative 
vineyards and small organic firms. The producers are strongly linked to the “quality revolutions” 
that took place in Piedmont in the last three decades. The 66% of producers began their 
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entrepreneurial activity after 1986, the year of “methanol wine scandal” previously illustrated. 
They are “new wine producers” whose family belong to the “old” peasants class (60%) and with 
high-level educational attainment, since 70% of them have degree or post-degree. The following 
table shows some key economic data, whose analysis of variance is statistically significant with 
respect to “type of wine producer”. We are dealing with small and medium size wine producers 
(median value of workers = 7; median value of revenue = 1.200.000 euros) and with a 
noteworthy tendency for export towards extra-regional markets: in average, nearly 50% of their 
revenue depends on foreign markets.  
Tab. 1 about here 
The local market structure is rather concentrated since, in average, 20% of revenue depends on a 
single key customer and 40% is determined by the first three most important customers. It’s 
worth to highlight that key customers are located mainly outside national borders: 71,4% of the 
answers with regard to the first customer, 72,1% for the second and 80% for the third. Wine 
producers are thus clearly oriented towards foreing markets. These long-distance market ties 
goes together with short-distance supplier and advice ties: wine producers have a rich and 
localized social capital. In average, wine producers have nearly one hundred stable suppliers of 
goods and ten of services. Goods suppliers provide mainly caps, barrels, grapes/musts and 
bottles (60% for the first three suppliers), less relevant are other goods such as machines (15% 
for the first three suppliers). As far as services supplier are concerned, we find mainly packaging 
(20%), chemical analysis (30%) and wine consultancy (15%), followed by transports (11%) and 
legal and commercial consultancy with percentanges less than 10%. The first three suppliers of 
goods are located in the same region, with percentages ranging from 60% to 70% for the main 
three suppliers. Services suppliers as well are located in Piedmont, with percentages ranging 
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from 75% and 84% for the first three. Finally, the richness of local social capital emerges also 
with regards to the advice network, namely the names of the people from whom wine producers 
seek advice for their entrepreneurial activity. In this case also, we find a rich local social capital: 
40% of the people named live in the very same local area of the wine producers and 40% live in 
Piedmont. Just 20% of advice ties live outside Piedmont.  
Along with market structure and social ties, the interviews included also some questions 
concerning quality conventions. We were both interested in understanding if the terroir idea still 
plays a role in the conception of quality of local wine producers and how this idea is linked to the 
quality conventions framework. Quality conventions were defined along three dimensions, 
according to Boltansky and Thévenot argument (2006): (i) definition of the concept of quality 
(quality is….); ii) judgement of wine quality (wine quality depends on…); iii) the relationships 
among wine producers (relations within wine market are…). This analytical distinctions proved 
useful to disentangle the folk concept of terroir. Historically, terroir – a French word without a 
suitable english translation – refers to an area or terrain, usually rather small, whose soil and 
microclimate impart distinctive qualities to food products (Barham 2003, 131). Wilson (1998, 
55), describes it in the following way:  
“Terroir has become a buzz word in English language wine literature. This lighthearted use disregards 
reverence for the land which is a critical, invisible element of the term. The true concept is not easily 
grasped but includes physical elements of the vineyard habitat—the vine, subsoil, siting, drainage, and 
microclimate. Beyond the measurable ecosystem, there is an additional dimension—the spiritual aspect 
that recognizes the joys, the heartbreaks, the pride, the sweat, and the frustrations of its history”.  
The interviewees were asked to choose the first and second quality conventions they relate to 
most (4) and we aggregate their answers according both to the representation of terroir found in 
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“natural documents” (books and documents produced by social actors not for research purposes) 
and to the findings of proper socio-economic research. We thus identified terroir and non-terroir 
answers (Fig. 7). According to one of the most famous idealists of terroir (Nossiter 2007), this 
means above all a way of using the prerogative of what is local (domestic convention). The 
relevance of the domestic convention is confirmed  by Ponte’s (2009) research, according to 
which the terroir is a combination of elements: “where intimate knowledge of the land, and 
long-term and fine-tuning of practices and varieties embed into the wine the natural elements of 
land and climate” (p. 243). Secondly, the convention of inspiration emerges clearly in natural 
documents. Here terroir is a celebration of wine's uniqueness and diversity and the concept is 
linked to spontaneity, passion and feeling (Boltansky e Thévenot 2006, 159): quality cannot be 
standardized but only achieved by means of a “unique” experience. This convention is coherent 
with the finding that terroir wines are: “against homogeneity of smell and taste, and leveling off 
and standardization of diversity across vintages (Negro et al. 2007, 19). A key element of terroir 
is also sharing the private good for the public good (civic convention). The world of civic 
conventions refers directly to the rhetoric of “certified quality” which emerged immediately after 
the methanol scandal. As is has been argued, terroir is strongly linked to the existence of a label 
of origin system (Barham 2003, 128).  This convention stresses the key role of public space, 
legality, the law, duty and formal rules (Boltanski e Thévenot 2006, pp. 185-193). Finally, the 
industrial convention, which refers to technology applied to grape cultivation and to wine 
production, emerges. Industrial convention per se is not incompatible with the terroir: large 
producers of more than 500,000 bottle a year are examples of terroir wine, which can combine 
tradition, genius loci, technology and production (Nossiter 2007). It must be stressed that this 
convention can be found at the edges of the conception of terroir, shared with other quality 
concepts typical of “international wines” based not on terroir but on grape. It therefore is a 
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potential area of strategic and symbolic disputa (Boltanski e Thévenot 2006). We considered this 
potential ambiguity when aggregating the answers (see endnote 5). Finally, market conventions, 
which refers to competition based on price, and the fame one – based on the opinion of experts 
and rating of guides – are the conventions to which terroir is opposed to most radically. Or, as 
natural documents tell us, the terroir must protect us from the devastating lies of marketing and 
the cynical exploitation of the market, culture and the political world and must represent a fight 
for the survival of individual taste against the debasing force of impersonal power (Nossiter 
2007) (5).  
Fig. 7 
Fig. 7 shows the result of the aggregation. First, quality is still strongly linked to the idea of 
terroir: despite the generalization of quality and the consequent price volatily, wine producers 
still give great emphasis on a concept of quality that goes against that of international wines. But 
the strenght of terroir is not equally distributed along the three dimensions: while the definition 
of quality and the judgment about it report percentages between 80% and 90%, wine producers 
rely much less on terroir in their economic exchange with others wine producers/agents of wine 
system. In other words, cooperation within a shared local identity and competition thorugh prices 
are both key elements of the local production market. Terroir is still a constitutive rule of the 
local wine production market for it shapes the identity of the producers that live in these areas. 
To be a producer, for those who hold this belief, means maintaining a close link between the 
terroir and the final product. But this in far from being an encompassing local identity: market 
ties and prices are as much important as terroir in regulating economic exchange. This is 
consistent with the local market structure previously illustrated, where long-distance market ties 
goes together with short-distance supplier and advice networks. Wine producers use either arms 
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length ties or market ties and embedded ties in their economic activity (Uzzi 1997). Worlds of 
quality are thus isomorphic to worlds of production (Salais and Storper 1997).  
6. Conclusions 
This article has analyzed the transformation of wine production market in Piedmont across 
25-30 years. The present regional focus on quality and exportation has occurred thanks first of 
all to an endogenous change made in the '70 by early innovators who imported the idea of the 
terroir from near-by France. This did not translate into economic success for the over-production 
problem and the low link between quality and wine production and consumption: merchants 
dominated over estate-wineries. In 1986 the criminal action of unscrupulous traders caused thus 
the methanol wine scandal. The reaction to the scandal founded the idea of “certified quality”, 
whose effects were to appear only in 1994 thanks to the institutional changes of the wine 
production market. Today, the normative idea of certified quality is represented in the regulative 
framework of the wine production market. From this viewpoint our results are in line with the 
idea that: “markets are explicitly moral projects, saturated with normativity” (Fourcade and 
Healy 2007, 22). 
When small local producers adhered on mass to the new institutional rules the language of 
certified quality lost its power. Local producers actually refers to a broader set of conventions 
than to “certified quality”. Nonetheless, the legacy of terroir is even so noticeable. Current 
conventions refer to the concept of the terroir and oppose the idea of “international wines”. But 
the avoid considering the folk concept of terroir as a panacea, we disentangled it according to 
the three dimensions of “quality conventions” framework: definition of quality, judgment about 
quality and relationships with others in the world of quality. We thus found that while the 
definition of quality and the judgment about it are still strongly linked to terroir, wine producers 
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rely much less on terroir in their economic exchange with others wine producers/agents of wine 
system. Our analysis also posed a number of research questions that need to be looked deeper 
into. The first issue concerns the entrepreneur-innovators who in the beginning sparked the 
change towards quality production. Who were they? Were they, as is often the case in the 
introduction of radical innovations, marginal individuals? (Day 1994). How did they organize 
their collective action? A second issue touches the time lag between the methanol wine scandal 
(1986) and the law reforming VQPRD production (1992, finally entering force in 1994. Why 
was so long a time period needed? Which are the collective actors that guided and opposed the 
reform? A third question points to the “grey area” of industrial conventions at the edge of the 
conception of terroir. It would be fruitful to select case studies where holding industrial 
conventions also meant keeping the terroir, and other cases were it meant leaving terroir in 
favour of international wines. Finally, the role played by wine professionals (winemakers, 






1 The analysis of “production markets” assumes that they are cliques of producers who watch each other 
reciprocally (White 1981, 543). 
 
2 According to Collins social life is changed and shaped by “ritual events” which create belonging to a group and 
shared meaning.  The presence of a common focus of attention in face-to-face situations generates an “emotive 
crescendo” which shapes shared cultural meanings. By means of a collective situation, this sense of belong to a 
group is created as well as enthusiasm and individual energy, symbols which represent and reinforce the 
ingroup/outgroup distinction, as well as a sense of justice, moral standards and legitimate sanctions associated with 
the violation of these standards (Collins 2004). 
 
3 Only those vineyards that have both their legal location and private residence have been taken into consideration. 
Only the provinces of Alessandria and Asti were considered given that no data was available for the province of 
Cuneo. 
 
4 In the interviews the different worlds were shown as neutral choices such as first type, second type, third type, etc. 
Wine producers were asked to choose as follows among three dimensions of the six worlds of quality (inspiration-
domestic-civic-fame-market-industrial): A) Quality is: 1) Like creating a piece of art: it needs inspiration and 
creativity; 2) To follow customs and traditions; 3) To safeguard the interests of the territory or some other collective 
interest; 4) Recognition by guides, experts and/or public honorary bodies; 5) Linked to price and the continual 
penetration of new markets; 6) Linked to technology and organisation of the firm. B) Judgement about quality 
depends on: 1) The emotions it arouses; 2) Informal judgements of those who have most experience; 3) Respect for 
formal rules of the “disciplinare di produzione”; 4) From public recognition; 5) From the sales price; 6) From 
chemical-physical characteristics; C) Relations within wine market are: 1) Inspired by passion and devotion; 2) 
Based on trust; 3) Taken from the collective interest; 4) Based on the recognition of third parties; 5) Guide by 
market prices; 6) Based on technical functionality evaluations. 
 
5 Be true as it may, we aggregate the quality conventions as follow: terroir = civic, domestic, inspiration + 
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